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We study the possible advantages of adopting of quantum strategies in multi-player evolutionary
games. We base our study on the three-player Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. In order to model
the simultaneous interaction between three agents we use hypergraphs and hypergraph networks. In
particular, we study two types of networks: a random network and a SF-like network. The obtained
results show that in the case of a three player game on a hypergraph network, quantum strategies
are not necessarily stochastically stable strategies. In some cases, the defection strategy can be as
good as a quantum one.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is a branch of mathematics broadly ap-
plied in a great number of fields, from biology to social
sciences and economics. A great deal of effort has gone
into the study of evolutionary games on graphs, which
was initiated by the work of Nowak and May [1]. Since
their work was published, a lot of effort was put into
studying the problem [2].
Quantum game theory [3] allows the agents to use
quantum strategies. The set of quantum strategies is
much larger than a classical one; hence it offers possi-
bility for much more diverse behavior of agents in the
network. It has been shown that if only one player is
aware of the quantum nature of the system, he/she will
never lose in some types of games [4]. Recently, it has
been demonstrated that a player can cheat by appending
additional qubits to the quantum system [5].
Combining evolutionary games and quantum game
theory, has resulted in absorbing results [6]. In some
cases the quantum strategies can dominate the entire net-
work, infecting it effectively. In our work we like to focus
on introducing additional strategies which the agents can
use, since in the multi-player case there exists a Pareto
Optimal Nash Equilibrium for the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game [7]. Moreover, the PD game is interesting to study,
because it was realized experimentally [8].
A hypergraph is a concept that generalizes the con-
cept of a graph by allowing edges to connect more than
two nodes at once. This concept can be applied for sys-
tems with evolution described by the extended spin-1/2
chain [9]. Based on this, the notion of hypergraphs was
proven to be a useful tool for assuring controllability of
multipartite quantum systems [10].
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This paper is organized as follows: In Section II a short
review of quantum game theory is given and in Section III
the types of 3-hypergraph networks used in simulations
are described. Section IV introduces the three-player
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In Section V the simulation
setup is described. Section VI contains results obtained
from computer simulations and their discussion. Finally,
in Section VII the final conclusions are drawn.
II. QUANTUM GAME THEORY
Games that admit the player to use the peculiarities of
quantum phenomena are referred to as quantum games
[3, 4, 11]. Of course, they are games in the ”classical”
sense. Actually, any quantum system which can be ma-
nipulated by at least one party and where the utility
of the moves can be reasonably quantified, may be con-
ceived as a quantum game. To be more specific, a two-
player quantum game Γ = (H, ρ, SA, SB , PA, PB) is com-
pletely specified by the underlying Hilbert space H of the
physical system, the initial state ρ ∈ S(H), where S(H)
is the associated state space, the sets SA and SB of per-
missible quantum operations of the two players, and the
pay-off (utility) functions PA and PB , which specify the
pay-off for each player. A quantum strategy sA ∈ SA,
sB ∈ SB is a quantum operation, that is, a completely
positive trace-preserving map mapping the state space
on itself. The quantum game’s definition may also in-
clude certain additional rules, such as the order of the im-
plementation of the respective quantum strategies. The
generalization to the multi-player case is straightforward.
Schematically we have:
ρ 7→ (sA, sB) 7→ σ ⇒ (PA, PB).
The following concepts are commonly used in the con-
text of quantum game theory. These definitions are fully
analogous to the corresponding definitions in ”classical”
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game theory. A quantum strategy sA is called dominant
strategy of Alice if
PA(sA, s
′
B) ≥ PA(s′A, s′B) (1)
for all s′A ∈ SA, s′B ∈ SB . Analogously we can define a
dominant strategy for Bob. A pair (sA, sB) is said to be
an equilibrium in dominant strategies if sA and sB are the
players’ respective dominant strategies. A combination
of strategies (sA, sB) is called a Nash equilibrium if
PA(sA, sB) ≥ PA(s′A, sB), (2)
PB(sA, sB) ≥ PB(sA, s′B). (3)
A pair of strategies (sA, sB) is called Pareto optimal , if
it is not possible to increase one player’s pay-off without
lessening the pay-off of the other player. A solution in
dominant strategies is the strongest solution concept for
a non-zero sum game. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma [3, 4] :
Bob : C Bob : D
Alice : C (3, 3) (0, 5)
Alice : D (5, 0) (1, 1)
(the numbers in parentheses represent the row (Alice)
and column (Bob) player’s payoffs, respectively). Defec-
tion is the dominant strategy, as it is favorable regardless
what strategy the other party chooses. In a Nash equilib-
rium neither player has a motivation to unilaterally alter
his/her strategy, as this action will not imcrease his/her
pay-off. Given that the other player will stick to the
strategy corresponding to the equilibrium, the best result
is achieved by also playing the equilibrium solution. The
concept of Nash equilibrium is therefore of paramount
importance. However, it is only an acceptable solution
concept if the Nash equilibrium is not unique. For games
with multiple equilibria we have to find a way to eliminate
all but one of the Nash equilibria. A Nash equilibrium
is not necessarily efficient. We say that an equilibrium is
Pareto optimal if there is no other outcome which would
make all players better off. Up to now a lot of papers on
quantum games have been published and some applica-
tion outside the field of physics have also been discussed
[12–18].
III. HYPERGRAPHS AND HYPERGRAPH
NETWORKS
We assume a hypergraph [19] network H(X,E) where
X is a set of nodes and E is a set of non-empty subsets
of X, E ⊆ 2X . Elements of E are the hyperedges of H.
We keep within the boundaries of the case when every
subset of X, A ∈ E satisfies |A| = 3, i.e. every edge of
the hypergraph connects three nodes exactly. Hereafter
we will refer to this structure as a 3-hypergraph. We set
N = |X| – the total number of agents.
We construct two types of networks: a random net-
work, in which all hyperedges connect random nodes and
a SF-like [20] network. We set the number of hyperedges
in the random case to |E| = 10000. The SF-like network
is constructed in the following way: First, a network of
m0  N all connected nodes is created. Then a new
node with m < m0 links is added to the network. For
each of the m links, a pair of unique nodes is chosen from
the existing network and a new hyperedge is added. The
probability of a node i being chosen is given by:
psf (i) =
ki∑
j∈X kj
, (4)
where k is the degree of a node. This procedure is re-
peated until the number of nodes of the network reaches
N.
IV. THREE-PLAYER PD GAME
The classical Prisoner’s Dilemma game is as follows:
two players can either cooperate (C) or defect (D). When
they both cooperate, each receives a payoff of 3. On the
other hand, when they both defect, each receives a payoff
of 1. When one defects, he/she receives a payoff of 5,
while the other gets 0.
This approach can be extended to a greater number
of players. In the three-player case, the payoff matrix is
shown in Table I. We can see that every player is bet-
Charlie C Charlie D
Bob
C D
Alice
C (6, 6, 6) (3, 9, 3)
D (9, 3, 3) (5, 5, 0)
Bob
C D
Alice
C (3, 3, 9) (0, 5, 5)
D (5, 0, 5) (1, 1, 1)
TABLE I: The payoff matrix of the three-player PD
game (after [21]). The first entry is the payoff of Alice,
the second denotes the payoff of Bob and the third
represents the payoff of Charlie.
ter off defecting than cooperating no matter what the
other players do. In terms of game theory, (D,D,D)
is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. If any
one player deviates from this strategy, he will receive a
lower payoff. On the other, we can see that the strategy
profile(C,C,C) can yield a higher payoff than (D,D,D).
In terms of game theory this profile is Pareto Optimal.
In our case the players are rational and the game will end
in (D,D,D), not (C,C,C); hence the dilemma.
In the quantum case the setup is as follows. Each
player is sent a qubit and can locally operate on it, using
any unitary operator U ∈ SU(2). The initial state of the
system is entangled:
|ψ〉 = J |000〉, (5)
where J is the entangling operator [22]:
J =
1√
2
(
1l⊗N + iσ⊗Nx
)
. (6)
The quantum circuit for the game is shown in Figure 1.
After the players have applied their respective strategies,
|q0〉 = |0〉
J
UA
J†|q1〉 = |0〉 UB
|q2〉 = |0〉 UC
FIG. 1: Quantum circuit for the three-player PD game.
UA, UB , UC are the strategies of Alice, Bob and Charlie
respectively.
the untangling gate, J†, is applied to the system, hence
the final state of the game is
|ψf 〉 = J†(UA ⊗ UB ⊗ UC)J |000〉, (7)
where UA, UB , UC are the players strategies. The payoff
of the first player (Alice) amounts to:
$A =
∑
i,j,k∈{0,1}
pijk|〈ψf |ijk〉|2, (8)
where pijk are numbers corresponding to the possible
classical payoffs of Alice, defined in Table I.
V. SIMULATIONS
We assume an initial population of 2500 agents, located
at the nodes of a hypergraph. The SF-like network is
constructed with initial size m0 = 3, and the number
of links of each new node is m = 2. Throughout all
simulations the network topology remains static. The
set of allowed strategies is as follows [6]:
S = {C,D,H,Q}, (9)
where the unitary operators corresponding to each of the
strategies take the form of::
C =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, D =
(
0 1
1 0
)
,
H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
, Q =
(
i 0
0 −i
)
.
(10)
In the two-player case, the strategy profile (Q,Q) is a
Nash Equilibrium of the game and the strategy H in-
troduces a miracle move when an agent uses it against
other’s classical strategy [4]. These strategies are ran-
domly assigned to agents in the network in such a way
that the initial fractions of strategies C, D, H, Q are
49%, 49%, 1%, 1% respectively.
Next, we introduce an additional strategy Σ, defined
as:
Σ = iσy =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (11)
The strategy profile (Σ, Σ, Σ) is Pareto Optimal and a
Nash Equilibrium [7]. We assign the strategies C, D, H,
Q, Σ with frequencies 48%, 48%, 2%, 1%, 1%.
Finally, we do not assign strategies randomly, but
choose to allocate the strategy Q in the first case and
Σ in the second one to nodes with the highest degree.
The evolution of strategies of agents is as follows. Ini-
tially, each agent is assigned a strategy based on the rules
described in the former two paragraphs. Next, agent i
plays an entangled quantum game with all other agents
forming a hyperedge with him/her. This is repeated for
all hyperedges e ∈ E such that i ∈ e. The total payoff
of agent i, Fi is obtained by accumulating all the pay-
offs from these games. After that, the agent i chooses
one of these agents randomly, denoted j, and imitate its
strategy with probability pi [23],
pi =
{
Fj−Fi
αmax(ki,kj)
, Fj > Fi
0, otherwise
, (12)
where α = max({pijk}).
The PD game is played by all agents on both networks.
We study the impact of the value of the parameter T
(moral hazard) on the final state of the population. This
parameter is defined as the first players payoff when other
players use the C strategy. Its interpretation is as follows.
Suppose the prisoners had a chance to discuss a strategy.
It is evident that they should decide for a Pareto Optimal
profile (C,C,C). However, if Alice decides to defect, she
receives a higher payoff. Thus this parameter measures,
how much Alice is tempted to betray the other prisoners.
The game is played for 10000 generations and the last
1000 results are stored. Average frequencies of strategies
are used as the final results. If a population does not
change for 500 generations, the state is considered to be
an equilibrium state of the system.
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In all cases, we show results for T starting from 5,
despite the fact that the game becomes a Prisoner’s
Dilemma when T > 6. We have done this to show the
behavior of the fractions of strategies near the transition
to the PD game.
In the case with four possible strategies, the results of
computer simulations are depicted in Figure 2. Figure
2a shows the results for a random network, whereas the
results for the SF-like network are shown in Figure 2b.
In the case of a random network, we see that strategy C
is the dominant one, until T = 5.64, when the network
starts shifting between strategies C and D. It settles
down at T = 6, where about half the agents use strategy
C. As T increases, strategies C and D slowly lose their
significance in favour of strategy Q. For T > 8 the system
reaches another equlibrium state, where strategies D and
Q have the same frequency.
5 6 7 8 9
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(a) Random network
5 6 7 8 9
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
D
H
Q
(b) SF-like network
FIG. 2: Results for PD on hypergraph networks, 4
strategies, strategies assigned at random, according to
weights.
In the case of a SF-like network, the agents prefer the
D strategy, which almost never reaches zero frequency.
Again, for T > 6 we have an increase of significance of
the quantum strategy Q. Although there are some oscil-
lations of the fraction of strategies as T increases, again
strategies D and Q have been adopted by approximately
the same fraction of agents. On the basis of the presented
figures as well as above discussion it may be inferred that
the change of type of the network significantly decreases
the importance of strategy C, but does not have a great
impact on strategies D and Q.
Figure 3 illustrates the results obtained for five possible
strategies. Figure 3a illustrates the results for a random
network, and Figure 3b shows the results for the SF-
like network. The examination of Figure 3a reveals that
it has the same character as the Figure 2a, except that
for T < 6 the dominant strategy is Σ not C. At around
T = 6, the network shifts from Σ dominated to a network
with three possible strategies: C, D, Q. As T increases,
strategies C and D lose their significance in favor of Q.
At around T = 8, there is another shift in strategies,
and the fraction of strategy C decreases to zero, and
strategies D and Q are used by equal fraction of agents.
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(b) SF-like network
FIG. 3: Results for PD on hypergraph networks, 5
strategies, strategies assigned at random, according to
weights.
On examining the SF-like network, we again perceive
behaviour similar to the four strategy case, but with
much less oscillations. Again for T > 6 it is observed
that strategies D and Q are used by approximately the
same number of agents. From the above discussion we
observe that the introduction of strategy Σ into the net-
work results in two observations. Firstly, for a random
network it is the dominant strategy for low Temptations.
Secondly, for a SF-like network, it stops some oscillations
of the network.
Next we move on to the case, where only one agent,
with the highest degree was assigned a quantum strat-
egy. For the case of four available strategies, results are
shown in Figure 4. Figure 4a shows the results for a
random network and Figure 4b shows the results for a
SF-like network. In this case the agent with the highest
degree was assigned the Q strategy, all other strategies
were distributed to the agents with equal probabilities.
We perceive, that for T < 6 the strategy C dominates
the network. Again, at around T = 6 there is a shift, but
this time the strategy H increases its significance. The
fraction of agents using strategy H slowly increases with
T increasing. In the case of a SF-like network, we obtain
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FIG. 4: Results for PD on hypergraph networks, 4
strategies, strategy Q assigned to the node with highest
degree.
that for T < 6.5 the strategy C dominates the network.
For greater T the network starts shifting from strategy
C to H, still a small fraction of agents also use the Q
strategy. Summing up this case, we can conclude that
strategy Q cannot infect any of the networks, but assign-
ing the strategy H to a relatively big fraction of agents
allows it to dominate the network for some values of T .
Finally, we show the results for the case with five possi-
ble strategies. Now we assign the strategy Σ to the agent
with the highest degree. The results obtained in this case
are shown in Figure 5. Figure 5a illustrates the results
for a random network and Figure 5b shows the results
for a SF-like network. For a random network, as can
be seen still that for T < 6 the C strategy is employed
by all of the agents. As T increases from 6 to 8, the
strategies C, Q and D are used by a significant fraction
of agents. At around T = 8 the strategy H dominates
the network. Then, just before T reaches 9, there is an-
other sudden shift and strategies D and Q are used by
the same fraction of agents, with other strategies being
far less significant. In the case of SF-like network, we
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FIG. 5: Results for PD on hypergraph networks, 5
strategies, strategy Σ assigned to the node with highest
degree.
observe an entirely different behaviour. The strategy Σ
always dominates the network, regardless of the value of
T . From this discussion it is evident that the Σ strategy
can only invade a network of a specific type. A random
network is immune to invasion.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We investigate the evolution of strategies on hyper-
graph networks when quantum strategies H, Q and Σ
are available to the players. Strategies Q and Σ are
considered to be invaders in our scenario. Our simu-
lations of the evolution of strategies on a random and
SF-like hypergraph network indicate that the structure
of the network is a decisive factor. In addition, we discov-
ered that, the strategy Σ, despite being Pareto Optimal
and a Nash Equilibrium for the three-player Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, does not invade the entire network in all
cases. In fact, it can only invade a SF-like network, pro-
vided that the agent with the highest degree is assigned
this strategy. In other cases, depending on the value of
Temptation, the network is dominated by strategy C,
what happens for T < 6, or strategies D and Q have
equal frequencies what happens for T > 8. The results
obtained for the case with four available strategies, are
slightly different. In this case the strategy Q is consid-
ered to be an invader. The results show that a random
network is invaded not by strategy Q, but by strategy
H for T > 6. On the other hand the SF-like network
constantly shifts between C and H for T > 6.
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